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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

Kendall Q. Northern,
Case No. 920116
Petitioner,
vs.
N. Eldon Barnes, et al.,

Priority No. 13

Respondent.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this case under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3) (a) (1992) which grants the Utah
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction to review "a judgment of the
Court

of Appeals."

Mr. Northern's

Petition

for a Writ of

Certiorari was granted on October 28, 1992.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Petitioner Kendall Q. Northern presents the following
questions for review:
I.

Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that habeas

corpus relief was not available to Petitioner and that Foote v.
Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991), did not apply to

Petitioner's claims that the Board of Pardons failed to provide him
procedural or substantive due process?
II.

Did the Court of Appeals err by refusing to address

the question of whether the Board of Pardons violated its own
procedural and substantive rules and thereby denied Northern due
process of law?
In reviewing decisions of the Court of Appeals, this
Court

accords the lower court's

statement

of

law,

statutory

interpretation, or legal conclusions no particular deference. The
decision is reviewed for correctness. State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d
464,465 (Utah 1991); City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d
513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied. 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES
A. United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment,
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
B.
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 7. No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.
C.
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 9.
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fine
shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual
punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested shall not be
treated with unnecessary rigor.
D.
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-27-5 (3) (1992):
Decisions of the Board of Pardons in cases involving
paroles, pardons, commutations or terminations of
2

sentence, restitution, or remission of fines or
forfeitures are final and are not subject to judicial
review. Nothing in this section prevents the obtaining
or enforcement of a civil judgment.
Other rules or statutes are set forth in the body of the
brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This case originally was an appeal from the trial court's
dismissal of a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and/or Writ of
Mandamus and/or Declaratory Judgment.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW.

Northern filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
and/or Writ of Mandamus and/or Declaratory Judgment on March 30,
1990, seeking to have certain actions of the Board of Pardons
declared unlawful and to have the trial court order that he be
placed on parole. (R.2)
On July 27, 1990, trial was held, at which time the court
heard testimony, accepted documentary and deposition evidence, and
heard the arguments of counsel.

At the conclusion of the trial,

the court took the matter under advisement. On September 26, 1990,
the trial court convened the parties and from the bench denied
Northern's petition. On December 7, 1990, the trial court entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order of Dismissal,
(R. 89) a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum A.
Petitioner appealed, claiming: (1) the Board of Pardons
violated its own procedural and substantive rules, thereby denying
Northern due process of law, (2) the term "new evidence" as used in
3

Rule 3.10 should be given its plain and literal meaning and, given
that meaning, there was no new evidence which justified rescission
of Northern's parole date, (3) principles of due process require
that Northern be given notice of the evidence relied on and the
reasons for the rescission of his parole date, (4) the Board of
Pardons's actions constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and (5)
the court should order Northern's immediate parole.
On January 24, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's denial of the writ, holding that habeas corpus is not
available as a remedy in this case to modify the release date
ordered by the Board of Pardons, Northern was afforded

full

procedural due process by the Board in its rescission of his parole
date, and decisions related to the setting of parole dates are not
subject to judicial review. Northern v. Barnes. 825 P.2d 696 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992). A copy of the court's opinion is attached as
Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 30, 1980, at age eighteen, Northern was convicted
by guilty plea of second degree murder and aggravated robbery, both
first degree felonies. Northern was sentenced to two five-to-life
sentences

at

the Utah

State Prison.

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law and Order of Dismissal ("Findings of Fact") No.
1. (R. 89) These pleas arose out of the homicide of a Salt Lake
City cab driver who was shot to death during the course of an armed
robbery.

The co-defendant, Robert Alan Phillips, who was then

twenty-six years old, admitted to police and the evidence confirmed
4

that he alone had shot the victim. He claimed that Northern had
encouraged

the second

and third

shots; Northern denied that

allegation. 90 day Diagnostic Evaluation, Exhibit 18 to Paul Boyden
deposition.

Northern, who was seventeen years old at the time of

the crime, had participated in the armed robbery and was present
when the cab driver was shot by Phillips; he testified against
Phillips at the preliminary hearing. Plaintiff's Exhibit 18, p. 2,
of deposition of Paul Boyden. Subsequently Phillips pled guilty to
capital homicide and was sentenced to life in prison.
On July 8, 1981, a year after his arrival at the prison,
Mr. Northern had an initial hearing before the Board of Pardons,
which determined that Mr. Northern would be paroled from the Utah
State Prison on May 10, 1988.
During

the

summer

of

1984,

Findings of Fact No. 2. (R. 90)
the

Board

of

Pardons

received

information from the Utah State Prison which established that Mr.
Northern had had a drug problem and that he had abused drugs during
the first two years of his incarceration.

Findings of Fact No. 3.

(R. 90) On September 24, 1984, the Board of Pardons considered Mr.
Northern's incarceration status, pursuant to a written request for
a reconsideration of his parole date. Findings of Fact No. 11. (R.
92) Accompanying the request was a caseworker's recommendation to
shorten Northern's term of incarceration.

The Board of Pardons

determined that Northern's parole date of May 10, 1988, should
remain intact.

Findings of Fact No. 4. (R. 90)

In March

1986 Mr. Northern was transferred

to the

Duchesne County Jail. He gained trusty status and during the next
5

two years worked outside of the jail.

Frequently

this was

unsupervised work, including substantial periods of time when he
labored on the farm of the elderly mother of the jail lieutenant.
At another location he helped construct a fire station.

During

this extended trusty period there were no reported instances of
misconduct

within

the community

and

no

attempts

to escape.

Plaintiff's Exhibit #23x to the

Findings of Fact No. 5. (R. 91)

deposition of Board of Pardons member Paul Boyden, attached as
Addendum C.2
On February 25, 1988, jail authorities learned that an
inmate had brought some marijuana into the jail and had given a
small amount to Northern.

Northern admitted that he had smoked

part of a marijuana cigarette. Defendant's Exhibit #41, p. 19 of
Defendant's Exhibit 33. This fact was timely reported to the Utah
State Prison and subsequently obtained by the Board of Pardons
sometime prior to May 10, 1988.
Despite

this minor

Findings of Fact No. 6. (R. 91)
infraction,

the Duchesne

County

Sheriff and the Duchesne jail commander wrote a letter on March 22,
1988, to the chair of the Board of Pardons in support of Northern's
desire to be paroled to his home state of Arizona upon his May 10
release.

Their letter commended Northern for the "substantial

X

A11 exhibits referred to in Petitioner's brief were received
and their admission is not the subject of any controversy. The
record page showing the offer and receipt of exhibits is attached
as Addendum D.
2

Mr. Boyden's deposition and the exhibits attached thereto
were received by stipulation of the parties and considered by the
court in lieu of live testimony. P. 16 of transcript of proceedings
of July 27, 1990.
6

progress" he had made during his two years in Duchesne. Plaintiff's
Exhibit #22 to Deposition of Paul Boyden, attached as Addendum E.
Northern had communications with Paul Larsen of the Board
of Pardons prior to May 10, 1988, as attempts to work out the
details of an intensive supervision parole were made.3

His April

1988 letter outlined his reasons for wanting to be paroled to
Arizona, although he indicated he would accept whatever parole
conditions that were required of him, whether in Utah or Arizona.
Northern letter to the Board, Defendant's Exhibit #22, attached as
Addendum G.

See also Transcript of April 19 hearing, p. 7.

Arizona had agreed to supervise Northern but insisted
that its parole unit determine the kind of supervision Northern
needed. Utah was unwilling to trust Arizona to make that decision.
Northern's only family in Utah lived in Moab, but Intensive
Supervision Parole (ISP) was not available there.

Where ISP was

available Northern had no family or friends and the various
psychological reports had indicated that family support would be
essential to Northern's success on parole. Defendant's Exhibits
#15, 24. The May 11, 1988, supplemental psychological report of Dr.
Carlisle, described more fully below, concurred in the need for

3

In the 1988 Board's determination that Northern should be on
ISP, it had received during its decision-making process a document
dated January 21, 1988, from the ISP supervisor and a correctional
technician, that recommended Northern's placement on ISP. Attached
as Addendum F, the document falsely stated that "the subject shot
and killed a cab driver for $26.00 in cash." Plaintiff's Exhibit
#2 to Boyden deposition. The influence this document had in the
May 9 recision decision is unknown, since Northern was never
provided a copy of the document and had no recision hearing at that
time.
7

family presence and support.
The communications between Northern and Larsen included
a Special Attention Hearing at the prison on April 19, 1988. After
the hearing Mr. Larsen recommended the following additions to
Northern's

1981

parole

agreement:

(1)

Complete

Intensive

Supervision Parole if available in Utah (2) Suggest maximum level
of

supervision

in receiving

state

(3) Random

urinalysis

(4)

Complete mental health therapy (5) Maintain full time employment or
full time student status and (7) maintain nighttime (7:00 p.m.)
curfew for first six months. Defendant's Exhibit #23, attached as
Addendum H.
The intention of the unidentified chairperson and Mr.
Larsen was to give the Board alternative courses of conduct:

to

either require Northern to remain in Utah and complete ISP or to
permit him to parole to Arizona, where its highest level of
supervision was recommended.
Neither

at

that

Tr. of April 19 hearing, p. 9.

time nor at

any

later

time was

Northern's

possession of a small amount of marijuana in February 1988 raised
as an allegation of misconduct that would interfere with his parole
date.

Deposition of Paul W. Boyden, dated July 6, 1990.
On May 5, 1988, Dr. Al Carlisle, the Utah State Prison

psychologist

and

Dr.

Ted

Brandhurst,

the

associate

prison

psychologist, conducted and filed a psychological evaluation on Mr.
Northern at the request of the Board of Pardons.

Unbeknownst to

Northern, the 1988 Board had made the request to determine his
suitability

for

release

on

parole.
8

During

the

evaluative

interview, Northern candidly disclosed and discussed his prior drug
abuse, which had begun at age sixteen. He insisted that he needed
to continue drug therapy while on parole, in addition to any mental
health therapy ordered by the Board. Defendant's Exhibit 24,
attached as Addendum I.
Drs.

Carlisle

and

Brandhurst

noted

that

Northern

presented himself as "articulate, intelligent and well-read", a
presentation consistent with earlier testing that showed Northern
to have a superior intellect.

While at the prison Northern

completed his Associate of Arts degree in Business and took three
technical training courses offered by the prison. The psychologists
also reviewed his prison jacket regarding disciplinary write-ups
and noted that he was reported by the Duchesne County Jail staff to
be a model inmate.
The psychologists also administered three standardized
tests to Northern and concluded that he was "honest in answering
test questions and tended to be overly truthful."
Exhibit 24.

Defendantf s

They found that:

Northern has shown a great deal of growth and
maturing since his last evaluation in 1984. Part of this
maturing may be due to age, but an important aspect of
his growth can be attributed to the social interactions
and interventions of adults, especially of the staff at
the Duchesne County Jail.
He has been given more
responsibility and respect than at any other time of his
life which, in turn, has led him to view himself as a
responsible adult.
Mr. Northern shows no evidence of mental illness at this
time. His major problem is his capacity to deal with
life's stresses without the use of illegal substances.
He fully realizes this shortcoming and wants to address
drug issues as part of his parole agreement.
9

Although Mr. Northern can be physically and verbally
imposing, he does not appear to have the capacity for
violent acting out.
He can be argumentative and
assertive, but responds to authority when necessary.
It is this writer's recommendation that Mr. Northern, if
he is paroled, be placed in a supportive environment such
as family or friends to make transition to society as
uneventful as possible. It is strongly recommended that,
in addition to any mental health treatment, Mr. Northern
receive drug abuse counseling.
FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE BOARD OF PARDONS DETERMINATIONS,
THIS REPORT IS TO BE REGARDED AS A FAVORABLE ONE." (Emphasis
in original.) May 5, 1988, psychological report of Drs.
Carlisle and Brandhurst.
In May 1988 the Board of Pardons had certain policies in
effect which governed its actions and proceedings, including Rule
3.10 which, in pertinent part, read as follows:
310-1.

Policy

The release or rehearing date established by the Board of
Pardons shall remain in effect [except] upon written referral
indicating that the offender is in violation of the rules and
regulations of the Utah State Prison, Community Corrections
Centers, or laws of any local, state or federal government, or
new evidence is presented that an inmate, if released, would
present a serious risk or danger to the community.
310-2.

Procedure

Prior to the rescinding of a parole or rehearing date,
information shall be provided to the Board establishing the
basis for the rescission hearing.
Upon receipt of such
information, the offender will be scheduled for a rescission
hearing. Except under extraordinary circumstances, the
offender will be notified of all allegations and the date of
the scheduled hearing at least seven days in advance.
Findings of Fact No. 12. (R.93)

The full text is attached as

Addendum J.
On May 9,

1988, the Board of Pardons rejected the

recommendation of its hearing officer, Paul Larsen, and without any
further discussion with no notice to Kendall Northern, rescinded
10

his May 10, 1988, parole release date.

Findings of Fact No. 13.

(R. 93) The Board notified the Duchesne jail commander by telephone
that it had rescinded Northern's parole date.
Prior to the May 9, 1988, rescission, Northern was not
notified of any allegations relating to the rescission and the
Board of Pardons did not hold any kind of hearing.

Northern was

not even informed that the Board was considering rescission of his
parole date. In a document detailing the rescission, the Board of
Pardons

made

the

following

remark:

"Continue

for

another

psychological evaluation and complete prison progress report."
Findings of Fact No. 13. (R. 93)
On

May

11,

1988,

Dr.

Carlisle

conducted

another

psychological interview with Northern and administered another
battery of psychological tests. The results of the five new tests,
the personal history inventory, and the interview were the same as
the testing done six days earlier:
"This test battery did not reflect any aggressive or hostile
tendencies toward self or others. . .His situation has been
thoroughly thought through in that he has anticipated the need
for a support system and employment. . .His parents
demonstrate concern and support. . .It is also recommended
that Ken be placed close to a family support system to better
enable him to cope with his job, expenses, and stress. His
parents in Arizona appear to be the logical choice for a short
period of time, and they are willing and anxious to help." May
11 Supplemental Psychological Report, Plaintiff's Exhibit #13
to Boyden deposition.
On June 23, 1988, the Board of Pardons scheduled a
hearing for July 8, 1988, to review Northern's status. Findings of
Fact No. 15. (R. 94) The hearing was designated by the Board as a
Special Attention Hearing, not a Rescission Hearing. The Board
11

requested its staff to notify the family of the victim of the July
8 hearing. Defendant's Exhibit 27. Plaintiff's Exhibits 7, 8, and
9 of Boyden deposition.

#9 is attached as Addendum K. At that

hearing on July 8, 1988, Northern was permitted to address the
Board of Pardons, present information to the Board, and to respond
to questioning from the Board.

Findings of Fact No. 16. (R. 94)

Northern's request to have counsel, David Bown, present
at the July hearing was denied.

His request to discover the

psychological reports was also denied.
30, and 31.

Defendant's Exhibits 29,

#31 is attached as Addendum L. At the conclusion of

the hearing, the Board of Pardons affirmed the rescission of
Northern's May 10, 1988, parole release date based upon his "risk
to

society"

and

the

need

for

"appropriate

punishment,"

and

rescheduled a rehearing for May 1990. Findings of Fact No. 17. (R.
94)
The first portion of Northern's July 8 hearing was
devoted to the Board's review of and reconsideration of the 1980
robbery and homicide.
participation.

Questions were put to Northern about his

The co-defendant's twenty year rehearing date was

noted by the chairperson.

Tr. of July 8 hearing, pp. 1-9.

The

next portion was a review of Northern's juvenile and institutional
history, especially drug and alcohol use and their relationship to
the robbery/homicide, including the matters considered by the 1981
Board and the 1984 Board that kept intact his 1988 release date.
Tr. of July 8 hearing, pp.10-21. The next segment focused on some
of the psychological information generated since 1980 and whether
12

Northern's statements about the crime to the 1981 Board are
inconsistent with his statements to the 1988 Board, i.e., whether
his involvement was a product of his immaturity or his drug usage.
Tr. of July hearing, pp. 23-26.4
During the course of the hearing, Board members made
statements pertinent to issues before the court:
"Chairperson 5:
Now, you understand that the board is
extremely concerned about anyone who's involved in this kind
of a crime, particularly to the public. And there are other
concerns too, you know, whether justice is served by the
amount of time which is spent. Those are all things that
we're concerned about, of course. And the board has taken a
long hard look at it." Tr. July 8, p. 10.
"Ms. Palacios: I'm at four different theoretical places, four
different approaches. . . [t]he conclusions that come from
each of the four. . .is that you should not be free. . .
"First of all, your behavior since this board saw you in 1981
(reviews four c-notes from 1982-1985). The acknowledgement by
you that drugs were a consequence, were part of the reason for
your committing the crime."
"That tells me that there is sufficient new information about
your behavior that relates to your dangerousness on the street
that requires this board to rescind your date." Tr. July 8,
p.26.
"Ms. Palacios: Second approach is one that has to do simply
with a perception of dangerousness about us, having nothing to
do with anything that occurred after 1981, but rather focusing
on you as an individual and the crime." Tr. July 8, p. 27.

References were made by the chairperson to his 1981 Board
hearing. Ms. Palacios was a member of both Boards. The Board had
at some unknown time destroyed or lost the tape recording of that
hearing, rendering it unavailable to Northern for his July 8
hearing or subsequent judicial proceedings.
5

The Chairperson is never identified in the transcript.
13

M

Ms. Palacios: The third approach. . . is just whether in
fact we had all of the relevant information at the time of the
hearing. And I'm not sure, you say you told us about the . .
drug problem. The fourth and final approach that I've taken
is the just deniable (sic in original) approach. It's the
notion—we have your fall partner in here on a 25 year
rehearing. It's the notion that even though the Hambys are
not here today, seven children grew up without their father,
and you had a critical part in his death. And that to release
you after only eight years is to depreciate the value of this
life and ignore the impact on the Hambys." Tr. July 8, p. 29.
"Chairperson: Mr. Northern, I think my major concern . . .
looking back on it, for a long time the major comment that was
made by any report that was written early, it was that you
just didn't seem to care about anybody, that in fact during
the course of lots and lots of interviews, that you never
expressed that you cared at all about the death of the victim
or these seven children who lost their father and a woman who
lost her husband." Tr. July 8, pp. 31-32.
Mr. Northern closed the informational part of the hearing
with this response, provided in pertinent part:
"Even early on I did feel remorse for what had happened. I
didn't show it. I played the tough guy all the way through
and didn't let anybody see anything. But I have always had
remorse about what happened and I have to relive it all the
time. It's me that had to go through this all the time, of
what I could have done to stop it is I could have stopped it.
. . .I'm sorry for what happened. I was out of control; I
know that. . .1 realize that seven kids had to grow up without
their dad. . .1 can't change what happened. I know that. But
I can go out and I can succeed and I can make my life better
and maybe I can help somebody else along the line somewhere to
help make up for what I did. I've done eight years in prison;
I was 17 when I came in. I've grown up in prison.
I've
matured in prison. . .I've lived in here with a snitch jacket
for all that time. . .I've shown, especially in the last two
or three years where I've been out at Duchesne county jail
that I have changed". Tr. July 8, pp. 33-34.
After a recess the Chairperson stated:
"Mr. Northern, as we explained earlier, the board is extremely
concerned about first of all, the risk that you present to
society from the overall record, from the nature of the crime
and specifically also including the information which the
board has received since that time and in comparing it with
the overall record. We also have concern as to the—as to the
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appropriate punishment for this seriousness of this kind of
crime. We affirm the rescission of the parole date of May
10th of 1988 and we order a rehearing in May of 1990. That's
an additional two years." Tr. July 8 p.36.
Northern petitioned for extraordinary relief during his
term of incarceration.6

That petition was denied.

During the

appeal from the trial court's denial of his petition/ Northern was
paroled.

As a new condition of parole, that was not part of his

1981 or 1988 parole agreements, the Board required Northern to pay
$26,350.00 in restitution.

825 P.2d at 698.

Northern currently

remains on parole in the state of Arizona, the state to which he
was permitted to go upon his release from the Utah State Prison in
July 1991.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals erred in finding that habeas corpus
relief was not available to Northern and that Foote v. Utah Board
of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991) did not apply to his claims
that the Board of Pardons failed to provide him procedural or
substantive due process. The lower appellate court's sua sponte
transformation of the important issues in this case related to the
Board of Pardons's exercise of power, its accountability therefor,

eAfter the Board ordered the two year rehearing for Northern,
he was returned to trusty status at the Duchesne County Jail. Some
months later, when he was notified that the prison had ordered that
he be returned the following day to the Point of the Mountain
facility to serve out his time there—to the same facility in which
the co-defendant was serving his sentence--Northern walked away.
He was apprehended in 1990, charged with and convicted of escape,
and returned to the Utah State Prison. None of the issues or
argument presented within this brief consider that charge or
conviction.
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and the due process rights of inmates subject to that power, into
a simplistic, illogical claim of credit for time served was an
improper, avoidance response to Foote.

Even though Northern was

pardoned a year and a half ago, he is entitled to an appellate
review and determination of the lawfulness of his incarceration
post May 10, 1988, and to an declaration of the nullity of certain
actions taken by the Board regarding his 1991 parole agreement.
The Court of Appeals also erred in refusing to address
the issues of whether the Board of Pardons violated

its own

procedural and substantive rules and thereby denied Northern due
process of law. Without any analysis or citation to any cases for
support, it abruptly and succinctly concluded: "Since Northern was
afforded full procedural due process by the July 8, 1988, hearing,
any of the alleged procedural deficiencies in rescinding his
original parole date were remedied before this petition was filed."
Such conclusion was error.

Subsequent tidying up by the Board

cannot rectify the trampling of rights to due process. In refusing
to address the underlying issues, the Court of Appeals compounded
its error and this Court must now review for the first time the
conclusions of the trial court.
Finally,

this

Court's

consideration

of

the

legal

conclusions of the trial court will clearly indicate that the trial
court erred in several ways.
that

the

Board

of

In so doing the Court should find

Pardons violated

its

own

prbcedural

and

substantive rules, thereby denying Northern due process of law.
After a review of all of the evidence, the court will have an
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abiding conviction that Northern's parole date was rescinded
because the Board believed the crime he committed in 1980 deserved
more years of incarceration than the Board in 1980 had ordered.
The Court should find that when the term "new evidence"
is given its plain and literal meaning, there was no new evidence
that warranted a finding that Northern, who had been a trusty
working outside of a county jail for two years, would be a serious
risk or danger to the community.
Such review ought also conclude that Northern should have
been given notice of the evidence relied upon by the Board in its
May 9 rescission of his parole date.

Additional information

developed between May 9 and the July 9 hearing, such as the
testimony

of

Northern

at

the

hearing,

cannot

provide

the

justification for a May 9 decision to rescind. The actions of the
Board of Pardons constituted cruel and unusual punishment in its
permitting Northern's parole date to stand for two thousand four
hundred eighty two days and on the day before he was to be paroled
to revoke it without notice and without basis, other than its view
that the earlier Board should have given him more time and that
release in 1988 would denigrate the life of the victim.
As a consequence of the errors made by the Court of
Appeals and by the trial court, this Court should reverse the
holding of the Court of Appeals, identify the due process rights
and violations at issue in this case that Foote left undefined, and
hold

that

Northern's

incarceration

after

May

10,

1988, was

unlawful. As a result the Court should order deleted from his 1991
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parole agreement the restitution order as it was improvidently
added in 1991. Had he been timely paroled, such restitution order,
which is in any event factually unsupportable, would not have been
part of his parole conditions. In addition, the Court should order
the termination of his parole in July 1993 in consideration of the
unlawful actions of the Board in May and July 1988.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF
WAS NOT AVAILABLE TO PETITIONER.
When the Court of Appeals held that "habeas corpus is not
available in this case as a post-release remedy to modify the
release date ordered by the Board," it rendered a decision in
conflict with decisions of this Court and decided an important
question of state law which should be and now will be settled by
this Court.

Utah R. App. P. Rule 46(b) and (d). Because of the

importance of the Court of Appeals' action and potential impact on
numerous cases beyond this case, this Court has, in granting
Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari, decided to review the action
of

the

Court

of

Appeals

and

consider

issues

regarding

the

accountability of the Board of Pardons that recent Utah Supreme
Court cases have noted but not had an appropriate opportunity to
fully examine.
In Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 (Utah
1991), this Court specifically held that "there is no question that
habeas corpus review of the Board of Pardon's action is available."
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The Court of Appeals' opinion in this case sidestepped Foote by
mischaracterizing the nature of Mr. Northern's claims.

Had the

Court of Appeals addressed the issues raised (as stated below), the
Court could have reached no other conclusion than that Foote
applied to this case.
Hurst v. Cook. 777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1990) provided a
retrospective of the writ of habeas corpus and the observation that
"the writ provided a judicial means for securing the liberty of a
person restrained by arbitrary or oppressive power."
1033.

Hurst at

It specifically recognized the writ of habeas corpus as a

necessary tool of the judiciary so it can be "armed with process
sufficient to fulfill its role as the third branch of government*"
Hurst at 1033.
In its designation of Northern's due process claim as
merely a claim that the Board should have credited Northern's
parole period with the additional years he served beyond his
original parole date, the Court of Appeals improperly manipulated
and characterized the claims to reach its conclusion that a writ is
not available.
Northern did not ask the Board to give him credit for
time served.

Northern did not ask the trial court to give him

credit for time served. His grievance was and is that the Board of
Pardons should have paroled him on May 10, 1988, and that all of
his detention after that date was contrary to the policies and
procedures of the Board of Pardons and to constitutional notions of
due process.

His remedy sought from the trial court was a
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declaration that his post May 10, 1988, detention was unlawful and
his immediate release on parole.
Once he was paroled (after the filing of his brief to the
Utah Court of Appeals), the remedy sought was a finding that the
Board of Pardons had violated its policies and procedures in
rescinding his parole date, that his continued incarceration after
May 10, 1988, violated his due process rights secured by the Utah
and United

States Constitutions

and was unlawful,

and that,

therefore, the new conditions of parole placed on him in 1991 were
null and void.

Chief among those new conditions was a restitution

order of $26,350.00, compensation ordered for the wrongful death of
the victim and the wholly speculative cost of child care for the
Hamby children, had Mrs. Hamby needed child care. (The information
provided in 1980 was that she was beginning to provide child care
as a source of income, not that she paid child care. ) See 1991
parole agreement and p. 4 of Plaintiff's Exhibit 18 to Boyden
deposition.
The Court of Appeals erred in analogizing this set of
facts to an inmate's claim for credit for time served in a county
jail while awaiting trial.

While Northern has argued that his

period of parole should be shortened by the length of his sentence
that was unlawful, that claim is based on a violation of his
constitutional rights, not because he was unable to make bail like
the defendant in State v. Alvillar, 748 P.2d 207 (Utah App. 1988),
who was held in jail prior to his conviction because of a parole
hold placed on him.

The pertinent question before the lower
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appellate court was how it should treat the consequences of an
unlawful period of incarceration.

By failing to apply Foote v.

Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991), the Court of Appeals
compounded the error because it refused to examine the claimed
violations of substantive and procedural due process, superficially
concluding that any procedural errors were remedied later and that
substantive due process claims would not be considered at all.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT FOOTE DID NOT
AUTHORIZE THE JUDICIAL REVIEW REQUESTED.
The Court of Appeals' conclusion that habeas corpus is
not available to Mr. Northern, and its disregard of the violation
of the substantive and procedural due process rights of Mr.
Northern (whose parole date was wrongfully rescinded through both
procedural defects and lack of legitimate basis), is inconsistent
with this Court's opinion in Foote that:

"It is the province of

the judiciary to assure that a claim of the denial of due process
by an arm of government be heard and, if justified, that it be
vindicated.,f

Foote at 4.

Northern presented the first opportunity since Foote for
appellate review of specific Board of Pardons procedures regarding
the

interpretation

and

significance

of

its

rules

regarding

rescission of an inmate's parole date — and the extent to which an
inmate is entitled to due process, including notice and a hearing,
in such Board action.

Foote anticipated the flushing out of such

due process requirements in future cases.
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Northern recognizes the discretion of the Board of
Pardons to set whatever initial release or rehearing date it wants,
as long as the date is within the parameters of the sentence
imposed by the court. The Board in 1981 could have set his release
date for 2000—or beyond. The questions to be decided in this case
concern what rights an inmate has when the Board seeks to rescind
an established parole date.

Because an inmate has a liberty

interest in that parole date, that date cannot be taken away except
for cause, notice, and an opportunity to be heard.
In other words, while the Board can be arbitrary in the
setting of the original parole date, it cannot later arbitrarily
rescind that date just because it determines that the parole date
no longer represents enough punishment, that today's society and
today's Board want longer sentences, and that the sentencing
guidelines in effect in 1988 recommend longer sentences. It cannot
substitute its judgement for the Board which, in some cases, may
have set a parole date twenty-five years earlier; such second
guessing is not good cause to justify rescission of a parole date,
although Board of Pardons member Paul Boyden believes it to be so
and has testified that the Board can at any time prior to the
moment an inmate walks out of the prison gates detain him and give
him more time. Dep. of Paul Boyden, p. 77
District courts around the state are taking increasingly
assertive actions toward the Board of Pardons, which continues to
claim that under Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (1992) its actions are
beyond judicial review.

In December 1991 the Third District Court
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in Rawlinas v. Utah Board of Pardons, Case No. 910905068, ordered
the Board to give Rawlings post-conviction, pre-commitment credit
for time served.

In February 1992 the Third District Court in

Smith v. Utah Board of Pardons, Case No. 910903060, considered via
a writ, Smith's claim that the Board had ignored the order of
Fourth District Court Judge Boyd Park that Smith be given 626 days
credit for post-conviction time served prior to his commitment to
prison.

(Addendum M ) .

David Young wrote:

In soundly criticizing the Board, Judge

"This entire area of law allows the Board of

Pardons to engage in discriminatory practices that jeopardizes the
credibility of the Board...."

A third case with similar claims,

Jensen v. the Utah Board of Pardons, Case No. 920901144CV, is now
pending in the Third District Court.

Whether discriminatory

practices occur at the front end of a sentence because of the
Board's unlawful practices or at the back end (in its refusal to
honor parole dates set by earlier Boards just because its present
members believe that

the crime inherently demanded

a longer

incarceration), appellate courts must decide the parameters of the
Board's discretion to act in these areas.

The Court of Appeals'

decision in this case is a retrenchment from this Court's opinion
in Foote.
Again, in its brief (one page) analysis of the claims,
the Court of Appeals, through Judge Bench, reached the indefensible
conclusion that Northern presents a case of application for credit
for time served, not a petition for a declaration that Northern's
incarceration post May 10, 1988, was unlawful and that consequences
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dependent upon the legality of that incarceration are null and
void.
Despite the compelling language of Foote that the Board
of Pardons must provide due process to prison inmates, and that
violations must be vindicated because of protections under the
habeas corpus, open courts, and due process provisions of the Utah
and United States Constitutions, the lower appellate court looked
at Foote only in light of the fictionalized "credit for time serve"
claim and refused to consider its application in the due process
claims*

In misconstruing important claims that will continue to

arise in inmate relationships with the Board of Pardons, it merely
held, without any analysis at all, that the July 8 hearing remedied
any due process errors, if there were any errors.
POINT III
NORTHERN WAS DENIED PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS IN THE RESCISSION OF HIS MAY 1988
PAROLE DATE AND THE JULY 1988 AFFIRMATION OF THE RESCISSION.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Mr. Northern asserted
inter alia:

(1) that the Board of Pardons denied him due process

because it violated its own procedural and substantive rules, (2)
that the trial court erred which it applied an unusual definition
to the term "new evidence" as used in Rule 3.10 of the Board's
rules and that, if a plain and literal meaning had been given to
the term, there was no "new evidence" to justify the Board's
rescission of Northern's parole date, and (3) that Mr. Northern was
not given notice of the evidence and reasons for the Board's
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rescission of his parole date. In its opinion the Court of Appeals
addressed none of these issues, opting instead to state that the
issues were "without merit" or lumping them into the one sentence
analysis that the July proceedings fixed everything. 825 P.2d 699.
In so holding the Court of Appeals departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings. Utah R. App. P. Rule 46(c).
In order to function legitimately and effectively, the Board of
Pardons is subject to certain rules and regulations which govern
its actions and proceedings.

In May 1988 the Board of Pardons

operated under Rule 3.10, the 1988 version of which is set out in
the Statement of Facts. That rule set out the Board's policies and
procedures regarding the setting and the rescinding of a parole
date and of the necessity of giving an inmate notice of a
rescission hearing and the opportunity to be heard before a
rescission occurs.

Findings of Fact No. 12. (R. 93)

Rule 3.10 was certainly adopted in recognition of the
Board of Pardons1 duty to afford due process to prisoners in
determining their sentence.

Fundamental notions of fair play

require that the Board of Pardons adhere to those rules and any
failure to do so was a denial of due process. International House
v. National Labor Relations Board, 676 F.2d 906, 912 (2nd Cir.
1982); Bills v. Henderson, 631 F.2d 1287, 1299 (6th Cir. 1980);
Government of Canal Zone v. Brooks, 427 F.2d 346, 347 (5th Cir.
1970).

The trial court also recognized this proposition when it

stated that "once a parole date has been granted, it cannot be
taken away by the Board of Pardons inappropriately or unreasonably
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or upon the whim of the Board members."

Conclusions of Law, p. 7.

(R. 95)
The trial court found, as a matter of law, that the Board
of Pardons complied with these rules. Unfortunately, the record in
this case demonstrates that such a conclusion was erroneous and
that the Board of Pardons violated its own rules in a number of
respects.

In its independent analysis of the conclusions of the

Court of Appeal and the trial court, the court should correct these
legal errors.
The language of Rule 3.10 is plain and unambiguous.

As

such, it should be construed according to its clear and literal
language.

Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth. 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989);

Cox Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline Construction, 754 P.2d 672,
676 (Utah App. 1988).
The

United

States

Supreme

Court

has

held

that

a

fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
recognized

much

the

same

principle

The Utah Supreme Court
when

is

stated

that

an

established principle of due process is that a court, or in this
case a governmental body acting in place of a court, "hears before
it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after
trial."

Christiansen v. Harris. 163 P.2d 314, 316 (Utah 1945).

The provisions

of Rule

3.10

seek

requirement.
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to meet

this due

process

The obvious import of Rule 3.10 is that a hearing is to
be held before the rescinding of a parole date. If it were not so/
there would be no need for the rule to state that "the offender
will be scheduled for a rescission hearing" because the rescission
would have previously occurred [emphasis added].
Northern was not given a hearing prior to the rescission
of his parole date.

Findings of Fact No. 13. (R. 93)

In fact, a

hearing was not held until July 8, 1988 —

over two months after

Northern's parole date had been rescinded.

Common sense requires

that the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner be provided before any deprivation of rights
occurs. The Board of Pardons cannot hold a hearing some two months
after the deprivation of a right and then claim that it has
afforded Northern the due process to which he was entitled when
having the length of his sentence determined.
The trial court seems to have held that the failure to
hold

a

rescission

hearing

was

proper

because

extraordinary

circumstances existed which justified the rescission of Northern's
parole

date

without

providing

prior

notice

to

Northern.

Conclusions of Law, p. 9. (R. 97) Assuming, arguendo, that such
extraordinary
excused

the

circumstances
requirement

existed,

that

these circumstances

Northern

be

"notified

of

only
all

allegations and the date of the scheduled hearing at least seven
days in advance."

A plain reading of the rule reveals that the

extraordinary circumstances exception has no application to the
requirement

that

a rescission

hearing
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be held

prior

to the

rescinding of a parole date.

Thus, Northern was entitled to, but

did not receive, a rescission hearing prior to having his May 10,
1988 parole date rescinded.
The procedures of Rule 3.10 further required that the
Board of Pardons notify Northern of the allegations against him at
least seven days in advance of the rescission hearing.

Northern

was not informed of any of the allegations against him prior to the
July 1988 hearing, and at that hearing he was not notified of any
allegations. Again, the Board designated that hearing as a Special
Attention Hearing, not a Rescission Hearing.
Each of these violations of Rule 3.10 by the Board of
Pardons denied Northern his right to due process.

International

House. 676 F.2d at 912; Bills. 631 F.2d at 1299, Government of
Canal Zone. 427 F.2d at 347.

The record shows that the Board of

Pardons condemned before it heard and inquired only after passing
judgment.

Christiansen. 163 P.2d at 316.

There can be little

doubt that Northern's parole was indeed taken away at "the whim of
the Board members" who, only after the fact, sought to justify and
legitimize their actions.
The trial court defined "new evidence" as found in Rule
3.10-1 as any information about Northern not available to the Board
in July 1981.

Consequently, the six year presence of Northern

within the prison system was new evidence; his omission after the
initial Board of Pardons hearing to reaffirm or reacknowledge his
remorse and regret about his crimes was new evidence; and the
difficulty of the Board of Pardons in creating an intensive parole
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program for Northern, who was to be paroled to his home state of
Arizona, was new evidence.

This definition is error.

The plain

and literal meaning of the term "new evidence" in Rule 3.10 is
evidence which was previously concealed from the Board of Pardons
or specific, affirmative

acts that occurred

or became known

subsequent to an inmate's last review or consideration by the Board
of Pardons. Because all else was known by the Board members or its
agents, under this definition, the only new evidence the Board of
Pardons had upon which to base its rescission of Northern's parole
was

a

recent

Psychological

Evaluation

—

a

report

which

specifically stated that it was to be viewed as a favorable report.
However, the evidence must not only be "new" under Rule
310, but it must also establish that the "inmate, if released,
would present a serious risk or danger to the community."

There is

no new evidence, even as the trial court defined "new", that could
reasonably lead to such a conclusion.

The best evidence of

Northern's likely risk level to the community is the two years he
spent as a trusty in the Duchesne County Jail, a privileged status
he still held at the time of the July 8 hearing.
The recommendations of the Sheriff and the officers who
supervised him and his lack of a single write-up for conduct within
the community suggests that Kendall Northern presented a very low
risk to the community.

For risk assessment purposes, Northern had

essentially been released into the community, and he had performed
very well.

Lt. Stansfield would not have permitted Northern to

work without supervision on his ninety-year-old mother's farm,
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where Mrs. Stansfield and Northern would have only each other's
company

for lunch on occasion, if Northern presented

even a

moderate risk of danger, much less a serious risk.
While anyone who has been convicted of a felony and
incarcerated at the Utah State Prison presents some risk of danger
to the community,there is nothing about Northern's conduct in the
community that suggests that he posed a serious risk or danger.
The Board's contrary conclusion about his risk to society arose
from the nature of his 1980 crime and cannot be justified as "new
evidence" under Rule 310.
The most fundamental principle of due process is
notice.

The only notice ever given Northern concerning the basis

for rescission of his parole date was that he was a risk to society
and needed to be appropriately punished for his crime. Due process
required that Northern be given notice of the reasons for the Board
of Pardons' decision and the evidence it relied on in reaching that
decision.

Thus, the trial court erred in finding only that there

was some basis upon which the Board of Pardons could have rescinded
Northern's parole rather than determining the actual grounds upon
which the Board of Pardons rescinded Northern's parole.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court should find the actions
of the Board of Pardons in May and July 1988 unlawful, eliminate
the restitution order of 1991, and require that Petitioner be
terminated from parole in July 1993.
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DATED this

2/

day of December, 1992.
Respectfully submitted,
HALEY & STOLEBARGER

JoQefrol Nesset-Sale
Pro Bono Attorney
for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this-2Q£hday of December, 1992:
R. Paul Van Dam
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
Room 236
Utah State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

JO QAROL NESSET-SALE

ADDENDUM A

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
C. Dane Nolan (4891)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents
6100 South 300 East Suite 403
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 265-5638
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

KENDALL Q. NORTHERN,
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND
ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff and Petitioner,
vs.
N. ELDON BARNES, WARDEN, UTAH
STATE PRISON AND THE DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS THROUGH THE
BOARD OF PARDONS,

CASE NO. 900901925HC
(Judge Timothy R. Hanson)

Defendants and Respondents.

THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the Court for
trial on July 27, 1990, the plaintiff/petitioner KENDALL Q.
NORTHERN being present in person and being represented by
counsel, JO-CAROL NESSET-SALE, the defendants/respondents being
represented by counsel, C. DANE NOLAN, Assistant Attorney
General, the Court having heard testimony and accepted
documentary evidence, the Court having heard the arguments of
counsel, the Court having reviewed the entire case file and being
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fully advised in the premises, hereby makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
Prison.

Mr. Northern is presently incarcerated at the Utah State
On July 30, 1980, at age eighteen, he was convicted of

Criminal Homicide-Murder in the Second Degree, a first degree
felony, and Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, and
sentenced to two five-to-life sentences at the Utah State Prison.
2.

On July 8, 1981, Mr. Northern attended a hearing before

the Utah Board of Pardons.

After the hearing the Board of

Pardons determined that Mr. Northern should be paroled from the
Utah State Prison on May 10, 1988.
3.

During the summer of 1984, the Board of Pardons received

information from the Utah State Prison which established that Mr.
Northern had had a serious drug problem and that he had abused
drugs heavily during the first two years of his incarceration.
This information was new information in that it was not available
to the Board of Pardons on July 8, 1981.
4.

On September 24, 1984 the Board of Pardons considered

Mr. Northern's incarceration status, including a caseworker's
recommendation to shorten his term of incarceration, and
determined that he should not be released on parole prior to the
scheduled parole date of May 10, 1988.
5.

In March 1986 Mr. Northern was transferred to the
2

Duchesne County Jail.

He gained trustee status quickly and

during the next two years worked outside of the jail.

Frequently

this was unsupervised work including substantial periods of time
when he labored on the farm of the elderly mother of Mr. Ralph
Stansfield.
station.
6.

At another location he helped construct a fire

During these periods he never attempted to escape.
Also, on February 25, 1988 Mr. Northern was discovered

using marijuana by jail authorities.

This fact was reported to

the Utah State Prison and subsequently obtained by the Board of
Pardons sometime prior to May 10, 1988. This information was new
information in that it was not available to the Board of Pardons
on July 8, 1981.
7.

On March 24, 1988, the Utah Board of Pardons requested

that the Utah State Prison perform a Psychological Assessment
upon Mr. Northern and supply that information to the Board of
Pardons.
8.

On May 5, 1988 the Board of Pardons received a

Psychological Evaluation performed by Dr. Al Carlisle, Chief
Clinical Psychologist at the Utah State prison, and his assistant
Dr. E. Ted Branthurst.

The evaluation indicated that at age 16

Mr. Northern had left home to wander the western states and
became deeply involved with drugs and people using drugs.

It

noted that Mr. Northern admitted that he was high on LSD at the
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time he committed his crime and that he had used LSD, cocaine,
amphetamines, and marijuana.

The report also stated that Mr.

Northern viewed his drug dependency as a major factor in his
anti-social behavior.

The report indicated that Northern's major

problem was his inability to deal with life's stresses without
the use of illegal substances.
9.

In Northern's favor the psychologists noted that while

at the Utah State Prison and Duchesne County Jail, Northern
maintained an excellent volunteer and work record, had an I.Q. in
the superior range, and had completed his Associate of Arts in
Business and three technical training courses offered by the Utah
State Prison.

The evaluation also noted that Northern had shown

growth and maturing since his evaluation in 1984 and did not
appear to have the capacity for violent acting out.

The

psychologists closed the report with a statement that "for
purposes of the Board of Pardons determinations, this report is
to be regarded as a favorable one."
10.

This information contained in the May 5, 1988

Psychological Evaluation was new information in that it was not
available to the Board of Pardons on July 8, 1981.
11.

During his 1984 written request for redetermination to

the Board of Pardons Mr. Northern did not express any remorse
about the crimes he had committed or the victims of his crimes.
4

12.

In May 1988 the Board of Pardons had certain policies

in effect which governed its actions and proceedings.

In May

1988 Board of Pardons Rule 3.10, in pertinent part, read as
follows:
310-1. Policy
The release or rehearing date established by the
Board of Pardons shall remain in effect upon written
referral indicating that the offender is in violation
of the rules and regulations of the Utah State Prison,
Community Corrections Centers, or laws of any local,
state or federal government, or new evidence is
presented that an inmate, if released, would present a
serious risk or danger to the community.
310-2.

Procedure

Prior to the rescinding of a parole or rehearing
date, information shall be provided to the Board
establishing the basis for the rescission hearing.
Upon receipt of such information, the offender will be
scheduled for a rescission hearing. Except under
extraordinary circumstances, the offender will be
notified of all allegations and the date of the
scheduled hearing at least seven days in advance.
13.

On May 9, 1988 the Board of Pardons rescinded Mr.

Northern's May 10, 1988 parole release date.

Prior to that

rescission Northern was not notified of any allegations relating
to the rescission and no hearing occurred prior to the Board's
action on May 9, 1988.

In the document detailing the rescission

the Board made the following remark:

"Continue for another

psychological evaluation and complete prison progress report".
14.

The second psychological report was prepared on May 11,
5

t

1988, by Dr. Carlisle and his psychology intern, Gail Caldwell.
It considered the issue of how Mr. Northern's relationship with
his father might affect his success on parole and concluded that
while the demanding nature of his parents, especially his father,
might create stress for Northern, his goal was to depend on them
for emotional support for only a short time after being paroled.
The report recommended that Northern be paroled to Arizona so he
could be close to his parents, who were anxious and willing to
help him adjust to life outside of prison.
15.

On June 23, 1988, the Board of Pardons scheduled a

hearing for July 8, 1988 to review Mr. Northern's status.

Mr.

Northern received notification of that hearing by June 28, 1988.
16.
hearing.

On July 8, 1988, the Board of Pardons conducted the
At that hearing Mr. Northern was permitted to address

the Board of Pardons, present information to the Board, and to
respond to questioning from the Board.
17.

At the conclusion of the hearing the Board of Pardons

affirmed the rescission of Mr. Northern's May 10, 1988 parole
release date based upon his "risk to society" and the need for
"appropriate punishment"# and rescheduled a rehearing for May,
1990.
18.

On October 9, 1988, Mr. Northern escaped from the

Duchesne County Jail.

On October 24, 1988, the Board of Pardons,
6

because of Mr. Northern's escape, rescinded Mr. Northern's May
1990 scheduled rehearing.
19.

Subsequently Mr. Northern was captured and returned to

the Utah State Prison.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Board of Pardons, in working within the indeterminate
sentencing scheme of the State of Utah, has the power to consider
the sentence imposed upon each criminal offender under its
jurisdiction and make that offender's sentence determinate.
The Courts should not interfere or review particular Board
of Pardons decisions lightly and should not reverse or set aside
such decisions unless the Board of Pardons has clearly violated a
constitutional right of the offender.
It is well established that an offender has no right to be
given a parole date by the Board of Pardons.

However, once a

parole date has been granted, it cannot be taken away by the
Board of Pardons inappropriately or unreasonably or upon the whim
of the Board members.
The question presented by this case is whether there is a
reasonable basis supporting the Board of Pardons' decision to
rescind Mr. Northern's May 10, 1988 parole date.

Board Rule 3.10

(text set forth above) provides the framework for answering this

7
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question.

It states that the Board of Pardons may rescind an

offender's parole date if the Board receives a written referral
indicating that an offender has violated correctional institution
rules or the laws of any local, state, or federal government, or
new evidence is presented which shows that the offender, if
released, would present a serious risk or danger to the
community.
On May 9, 1988, the Board of Pardons had received no written
referral from any source which suggested that Mr. Northern had
violated institutional rules.
inapplicable.

Thus, that portion of Rule 3.10 is

Additionally, the grant of parole had not been

rescinded upon its own terms because of any violation of
institutional rules.
Under the second alternative under Rule 3.10, this Court
defines "new evidence" as negative information received by the
Board of Pardons between the time that a parole release date is
set and the time that a rescission determination is made.

In

this case those dates are July 8, 1981 and May 9, 1988. This
Court defines "risk or danger to the community" to include the
situation where a person is likely to commit a crime.
After a careful analysis of the entire record in this case
and keeping in mind that this Court cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the Board of Pardons, this Court's ruling is
8

f '

t

evidence" received b y the Board

which justified

Board's decision to r e s c u ill Hi

May

1988 parole d a t e .

Pardons

There w a s evidence regarding M r .

*

State Prison and drug u s e at

Duchesne County J a i l .

Such drug u s e w a s illegal

3

evidence which showed that M r . Northern failed to show a n y
remnjLht1 I 111 II 11

111 il 1 in 1

and that his behavior w a s f

d i m 1 II IIin 1 1 imc

In 111111 committed

some e x t e n t , anti-social

This new

evidence indicated t h a t , if released, M r . Northern would present
a serious risk or danger t.o I In?
Als

commim

circumstances relating to M r . Northern on r

1

*),

aordinary circumstances under Rule ^.^v

w h i c h justified the rescission of the parole date without
providing prior notice to M r . Northern.
JkJi 11 I, 1 o n 1 i I |"

1 1 1 in" 1 -1 "i - i" 111 I Ihiii' -I1 "ii I, 1 1 (,! record l.pads the Court

to conclude that the Board
Northern

Pardons did not rescind M r .

> release date because

b e incarcerated

believed
• <»" ,o-

deserved to
1 1

1 "re

of his c r i m e .

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
For the reasons set forth a b o v e , the Board of Pardons did
r

(,'otifJ i tut. ional r i g h t s .

The petition

>

- vi'-t

11

for a writ of habeas corpus is, therefore', denied with prejudice.
DATED THIS

j_ DAY OF DECEMBER, /990

FUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

r

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

ATTEST

J07CAR0L NESSET-SALE
Attorney for Plaintiff/Petitioner
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Kendall Q. Northern unsuccessfully petitioned the trial
court for a writ of habeas corpus following a decision of the
Board of Pardons (the Board) to rescind his original parole date,
Northern appealed the trial court's decision, but was
subsequently paroled during the pendency of this appeal. We
affirm.
FACTS
In 1980, Northern, an eighteen-year-old drifter, pleaded
guilty to second degree murder and aggravated robbery for his
participation in the shooting death of a cab driver earlier that
same year. Northern was sentenced to two five-to-life sentences
at the Utah State Prison. He later admitted he was under the
influence of LSD at the time of the shooting, and had been deeply
involved in drugs.

^

After Northern had been imprisoned for a year, the Board met
and granted him a May 10, 1988 parole date- The Board
reconsidered Northern's status in 1984, and determined that the
1988 parole date would remain intact despite evidence that
Northern had used drugs at the prison during his incarceration.
In 1986, Northern was transferred to the Duchesne County
Jail where he attained trustee status. Over the next two years,
Northern was allowed to work unsupervised outside the jail- In
early 1988, with only a few months remaining before his projected
parole, jail authorities discovered that Northern was again using
drugs. This information was reported to the prison and received
by the Board before his parole date.
Two months before his parole date, a psychological
assessment of Northern was made at the request of the Board- The
report indicated that Northern had been a heavy drug user, and
had been unable to deal with life's stresses without drugs. The
report also said Northern acknowledged that his drug dependence
was a major factor contributing to his antisocial behavior.
Before the report was published, the Board also attempted to
obtain Northern's consent to additional terms of release that
would have included drug testing. On the advice of his father,
however, Northern refused to consent to the new conditions.
On May 9, 1988, the Board rescinded Northern's May 10 parole
date, pending further review, and ordered another psychological
evaluation. The need for another psychological evaluation and
complete prison progress report was listed in the written notice
by the Board as the ground for rescinding Northern'^ original
parole date. The supplemental assessment focused on potential
problems affecting Northern's adjustment into society posed by
his relationship with his father. A full rescission hearing was
then scheduled for July 8, 1988.l
At that hearing, the Board determined that Northern
continued to be a risk to society, and refused to grant him
parole at that time. The Board scheduled a rehearing for May
1990, and Northern was returned to the Duchesne County Jail. Two
months later, however, he escaped and fled to Canada. The Board
then rescinded the rehearing scheduled for May 1990. Northern
was captured and returned to prison on October 6, 1989.

1. The administrative rules of the Board state, as policy, that
M
[a]n offender shall be notified at least seven calendar days in
advance of a hearing, except in extraordinary circumstances, and
shall be specifically advised as to the purpose of the hearing."
See Utah Admin. R. 655-202 (1991).
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Northern petitioned for extraordinary relief and habeas
corpus under Rule 65B(b)(2) and (4), and (f) of the Utah Rules
Civil Procedure.2 The petition prayed for (1) declaratory relief
as to the unlawfulness of Northern's confinement since May 10,
1988, (2) a demand for his immediate release, and (3) damages in
excess of $1 0,000 for "breach of contract" on the ground that a
parole date created a legally binding agreement on the State.
After a hearing, the trial court denied the petition, and
Northern filed a noti ce of appeal. The Board subsequently set a
July 1991 parole date, and required restitution of $26,350 by
Northern as a condition of parole. Northern agreed to the new
conditions, and was paroled on Ju] y 9, 2 99] , whi 3 e this appeal
was pending.
ANALYSIS
In general, the purpose of extraordinary relief under Rule
65B is to test the lawfulness of imprisonment, and the propriety
of any related proceedings, by forcing a judicial hearing. See
Ziealer v. Miliken. 583 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Utah 1978). Northern
presents no authority, however, for extending the purposes of
extraordinary writs as a procedure to bring contract claims. We
also conclude that the demand for Northern's immediate parole is
moot because parole was granted subsequent to the filing of this
appeal. Spain v. Stewart, 639 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah 1981). 3 We
are therefore left only with Northern's prayer for declaratory
relief as to the in il awfulness of h i s "confinement."
Inasmuch as Northern is r to longer incarcerated, we must
consider whether his request for declaratory relief is also moot.
Courts have reviewed habeas corpus petitions that would have been
otherwise rendered moot by the release of a prisoner when the
prisoner suffers "collateral legal consequences" from a
conviction, such as "the use of the conviction to impeach the
petitioner's character or as a factor in determining a sentence
2. Rule 65B was complete]y reorganized after Northern's petition
was filed. See Utah R. Ci v. P 65B (amended effective September
1
1QQ1
) and advisory committee note.
Although moot questions are generally not considered on
appeal due to the judicial policy against advisory opinions,
courts have reached the merits of an issue that is technically
moot, but is "of wide concern, affects the public interest, is
likely to recur in a similar manner, and, because of the brief
time any one person is affected, would otherwise likely escape
judicial review . . . ." Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899
(Utah 1981).
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in a future trial, as well as petitioner's inability to vote,
engage in certain businesses, or serve on a jury." Duran v.
Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1981).
Northern argues that he would have completed his parole in
May 1991, if the Board had not violated his due process rights in
rescinding his original parole date. Thus, the request for
declaratory relief becomes a question of whether Northern's
extended parole status was a collateral legal consequence of
alleged due process violations. In Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S.
236, 243, 83 S. Ct. 373, 377 (1963), the United States Supreme
Court held that release on parole does not render a petition for
habeas corpus moot because parole "imposes conditions which
significantly confine and restrain [a parolee's] freedom." Since
parole imposes conditions of confinement and Northern's parole
status past May 1991 is a consequence of rescinding his original
parole date, we proceed to address his claim for credit against
his parole period for time served while incarcerated after his
original parole date.
In prior cases, discretion to give credit for time served
was determined to lie solely with the Board. In State v.
Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 277 (Utah 1985), the reason given for
rejecting a similar argument demanding credit for time served was
the Board's discretion to determine the period of time to be
served. Likewise, in State v. Alvillar, 748 P.2d 207, 208-09
(Utah App. 1988), we held that Utah courts have no authority to
grant credit for time served prior to conviction since the power
to reduce or terminate sentences is vested exclusively with the
Board under Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (1990).
Northern suggests that the Board's exercise of this
discretionary authority is now subject to* judicial review under
the recent case of Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734
(Utah 1991). We disagree. In Foote, a prisoner sought an
extraordinary writ, contending "that the.manner in which his
parole hearings have been conducted [had] deprived him of
procedural due process." Id. The Utah Supreme Court held that,
under the Utah Constitution, an inmate is entitled to due process
in proceedings before the Board. Ijd. at 735. The supreme court
then referred the case to a trial court to ascertain factually
"the procedures followed by the board" and to decide what is
procedurally required in. "the conduct of the parole hearings."
Id. Since Northern was afforded full procedural due process by
the July 8, 1988 hearing, any of the alleged procedural
deficiencies in rescinding his original parole date were remedied
before this petition was filed. Northern's claim relates,
therefore, not to the procedural due process issues outlined in
Foote, but to the reasonableness of the Board's decision in not
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rved beyond his original

granting Nor
parole date.

Termination of Northeri i s sentence is triggered by
"completion of three years on parole outside of confinement and
without violation .
• unless the person is earlier terminated
by the Board of Pardons." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202(1) (1990).
"Any time spent in confinement awaiting a hearing
concerning revocation of parole constitutes service of sentence"
rather than time on parole. Section 76-3-202(3)(c). Since the
Board has discretion to parole or discharge an inmate at any
time, see section 76-3-202(5), it could have given Northern a
parole period of less than three years and thereby credited him
for the time served while incarcerated beyond his original parole
date. We deem the Board's decision to not give Northern an
earlier release date an exercise of its discretion.
The Board's ri ght to rely on any factors known in May 1988,
or later adduced at the July 1988 hearing, and the weight to be
afforded such factors in deciding whether Northern posed a
societal risk, as we J 1 as whether an order of restitution was
appropriate, are all matters within the discretion o'f the Board.
They are precisely the kinds of issues that are not subject to
judicial review under section 77-27-5(3)
Accordingly, we hold
that habeas corpus is not available in this case as a post
release remedy to modify the release date ordered by the Boa r cl
We have reviewed the remaining issues raised on appeal and
deem them to be without merit. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d
886, 888 (Utah 1989) It is within our discretion to "analyze and
address in wr^^r-r
. .•:• and every argument, issue, or claim
raised").

A
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CONCLUSION
The trial court's denial of the writ is affirmed,

jZUtc^l tOrOef^J^
Russell W. Bench,
Presiding Judge
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Inmate petitioned for habeas corpus
after his original parole date was rescinded. The Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Timothy R. Hanson, J., denied the
petition, and inmate appealed. While appeal was pending, inmate was paroled.
The Court of Appeals, Bench, PJ., held
that (1) inmate's request for declaratory
relief was not moot following his release on
parole, and (2) decision of Board of Pardons
to not give inmate earlier release was an
exercise of its discretion.
Affirmed.
Billings, J., concurred in the result
See also 814 P.2d 1148.

1. Courts <*=»207.1
In general, purpose of extraordinary
relief under extraordinary writs rule is to
test lawfulness of imprisonment, and propriety of any related proceedings, by forcing judicial hearing. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule
65B.
2. Courts «=>207.1
Extraordinary writs rule does not provide procedure to bring contract claims.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 65B.
3. Habeas Corpus <*=>826(2)
Inmate's demand for immediate parole
was moot where parole was granted subsequent to filing of appeal from denial of
petition for writ of habeas corpus. Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule 65B.

4. Declaratory Judgment $=>84
A parolee's request for declaratory relief as to unlawfulness of his confinement
was not rendered moot by fact that parole
was granted subsequent to filing of appeal;
parolee was alleging that if Board of Pardons had not violated his due process
rights in rescinding his original parole date
he would have completed his parole, and
parolee was claiming credit against his parole period for time served while incarcerated after his original parole date.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 5, 14.
5. Criminal Law «=>1216.1(2)
Discretion to give credit for time
served lies solely with the Board of Pardons. U.C.A.1953, 77-27-5(3).
6. Prisons «=»15(1)
Power to reduce or terminate sentences is vested exclusively within Board of
Pardons. U.C.A.1953, 77-27-5(3).
7. Pardon and Parole $=»59
Any of alleged procedural deficiencies
in rescinding inmate's original parole date
were remedied by full rescission hearing
held before Board of Pardons. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmends. 5, 14.
8. Habeas Corpus e»516
Habeas corpus was not available as
postrelease remedy to modify release date
ordered by the Board of Pardons, even
though parolee's original scheduled parole
date was rescinded by Board of Pardons
one day before parole date; Board had
right to rely on any factors known at the
time, including parolee's drug history, or
later adduced at hearing ordered and had
discretion to determine weight to be given
to the factors. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-202(1),
(3Kc), (5), 77-27-5(3).
Jo Carol Nesset-Sale, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and appellant
R. Paul Van Dam, Lorenzo K. Miller, and
Kirk M. Torgensen, Salt Lake City, for
defendants and appellees.
Before BENCH, PJ., and BILLINGS and
GARFF, JJ.
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OPINION
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
Kendall Q. Northern unsuccessfully petitioned the trial court for a writ of habeas
corpus following a decision of the Board of
Pardons (the Board) to rescind his original
parole date. Northern appealed the trial
court's decision, but was subsequently paroled during the pendency of this appeal.
We affirm.
FACTS
In 1980, Northern, an eighteen-year-old
drifter, pleaded guilty to second degree
murder and aggravated robbery for his
participation in the shooting death of a cab
driver earlier that same year. Northern
was sentenced to two five-to-life sentences
at the Utah State Prison. He later admitted he was under the influence of LSD at
the time of the shooting, and had been
deeply involved in drugs.
After Northern had been imprisoned for
a year, the Board met and granted him a
May 10, 1988 parole date. The Board reconsidered Northern's status in 1984, and
determined that the 1988 parole date would
remain intact despite evidence that Northern had used drugs at the prison during his
incarceration.
In 1986, Northern was transferred to the
Duchesne County Jail where he attained
trustee status. Over the next two years,
Northern was allowed to work unsupervised outside the jail. In early 1988, with
only a few months remaining before his
projected parole, jail authorities discovered
that Northern was again using drugs.
This information was reported to the prison
and received by the Board before his parole
date.
Two months before his parole date, a
psychological assessment of Northern was
made at the request of the Board. The
report indicated that Northern had been a
1. The administrative rules of the Board state, as
policy, that "[a]n offender shall be notified at
least seven calendar days in advance of a hearing, except in extraordinary circumstances, and
shall be specifically advised as to the purpose of
the hearing." See Utah Admin.R. 655-202
(1991).

heavy drug user, and had been unable to
deal with life's stresses without drugs.
The report also said Northern acknowledged that his drug dependence was a major factor contributing to his antisocial behavior. Before the report was published,
the Board also attempted to obtain Northem's consent to additional terms of release
that would have included drug testing. On
the advice of his father, however, Northern
refused to consent to the new conditions.
On May 9, 1988, the Board rescinded
Northern's May 10 parole date, pending
further review, and ordered another psychological evaluation. The need for another psychological evaluation and complete
prison progress report was listed in the
written notice by the Board as the ground
for rescinding Northern's original parole
date. The supplemental assessment focused on potential problems affecting
Northern's adjustment into society posed
by his relationship with his father. A full
rescission hearing was then scheduled for
July 8, 1988.1
At that hearing, the Board determined
that Northern continued to be a risk to
society, and refused to grant him parole at
that time. The Board scheduled a rehearing for May 1990, and Northern was returned to the Duchesne County Jail. Two
months later, however, he escaped and fled
to Canada. The Board then rescinded the
rehearing scheduled for May 1990. Northern was captured and returned to prison on
October 6, 1989.
Northern.petitioned for extraordinary relief and habeas corpus under Rule 65B(bX2)
and (4), and (f) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.2 The petition prayed for (1)
declaratory relief as to the unlawfulness of
Northern's confinement since May 10,
1988, (2) a demand for his immediate release, and (3) damages in excess of $10,000
for "breach of contract" on the ground that
2. Rule 65B was completely reorganized after
Northern's petition was filed. See Utah R.Civ.P.
65B (amended effective September 1, 1991) and
advisory committee note.
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a parole date created a legally binding right* in rescinding his original parole date.
agreement on the State. After a hearing, Thus, the request for declaratory relief bethe trial court denied the petition, and come* * question of whether Northern's
Northern filed a notice of appeal. The extended parole status was a collateral leBoard subsequently set a July 1991 parole gal consequence of alleged due process viodate, and required restitution of $26,350 by lations. In Jones v. Cunningham, 371
Northern as a condition of parole. North- U.S. 236, 243, 83 S.Ct 373, 377, 9 L.EA2d
ern agreed to the new conditions, and was 285 (1963), the United States Supreme
paroled on July 9, 1991, while this appeal Court held that release on parole does not
render a petition for habeas corpus moot
was pending.
because parole "imposes conditions which
significantly confine and restrain [a parolANALYSIS
ee's] freedom." Since parole imposes con[1-3] In general, the purpose of exditions of confinement and Northern's patraordinary relief under Rule 65B is to test
role status past May 1991 is a consequence
the lawfulness of imprisonment, and the
of rescinding his original parole date, we
propriety of any related proceedings, by
proceed to address his claim for credit
forcing a judicial hearing. See Ziegler v.
against his parole period for time served
Miliken, 583 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Utah 1978).
while incarcerated after his original parole
Northern presents no authority, however,
date.
for extending the purposes of extraordinary writs as a procedure to bring contract
[5,6] In prior cases, discretion to give
claims. We also conclude that the demand credit for time served was determined to lie
for Northern's immediate parole is moot sotety wfth the Board. Iii State v. Scfireubecause parole was granted subsequent to der, 712 P.2d 264, 277 (Utah 1985), the
thefilingof this appeal. Spain v. Stewart, reason given for rejecting a similar argu639 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah 1981).* We are ment demanding credit for time served was
therefore left only with Northern's prayer the Board's discretion to determine the pefor declaratory relief as to the unlawful- riod of time to be served. Likewise, in
ness of his "confinement"
State v. Alvillar, 748 P.2d 207, 208-09
[4] Inasmuch as Northern is no longer (Utah App.1988), we held that Utah courts
incarcerated, we must consider whether his have no authority to grant credit for time
request for declaratory relief is also moot served prior to conviction since the power
Courts have reviewed habeas corpus peti- to reduce or terminate sentences is vested
tions that would have been otherwise ren- exclusively with the Board under Utah
dered moot by the release of a prisoner Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (1990).
when the prisoner suffers "collateral legal
[7] Northern suggests that the Board's
consequences" from a conviction, such as exercise of this discretionary authority is
"the use of the conviction to impeach the now subject to judicial review under the
petitioner's character or as a factor in de- recent case of Foote v. Utah Board of
termining a sentence in a future trial, as Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991). We
well as petitioner's inability to vote, engage disagree. In Foote, a prisoner sought an
in certain businesses, or serve on a jury." extraordinary writ, contending "that the
Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah rmtKver in which his parole hearing* have
1981).
been conducted [had] deprived him of proNorthern argues that he would have cedural due process." Id. The Utah Sucompleted his parole in May 1991, if the preme Court held that, under the Utah
Board had not violated his due process Constitution, an inmate is entitled to due
3. Although moot questions are generally not
considered on appeal due to the judicial policy
against advisory opinions, courts have reached
the merits of an issue that is technically moot,
but is "of wide concern, affects the public inter-

est, is likely to recur in a similar manner, and,
because of the brief time any one person is
affected, would otherwise likely escape judicial
review...." Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896,
899 (Utah 1981).

STATE v. CASTNER

Utah 699

CIUM825 ?2d 699 (UtahApp. 1992)

process in proceedings before the Board,
Id. at 735. The supreme court then referred the case to a trial court to ascertain
factually "the procedures followed by the
board" and to decide what is procedurally
required in "the conduct of the parole hearings." Id. Since Northern was afforded
full procedural due process by the July 8,
1988 hearing, any of the alleged procedural
deficiencies in rescinding his original parole
date were remedied before this petition
was filed. Northern's claim relates, therefore, not to the procedural due process
issues outlined in Foote, but to the reasonableness of the Board's decision in not
granting Northern credit for the time
served beyond his original parole date.
[8] Termination of Northern's sentence
is triggered by "completion of three years
on parole outside of confinement and without violation . . . unless the person is earlier terminated by the Board of Pardons."
Utah Code Ann. § 7^-3-202(1) (1990).
"Any time spent in confinement awaiting a
hearing . . . concerning revocation of parole
constitutes service of sentence" rather
than time on parole. Section 76-3202(3Xc). Since the Board has discretion to
parole or discharge an inmate at any time,
see section 76-3-202(5), it could have given
Northern a parole period of less than three
years and thereby credited him for the time
served while incarcerated beyond his original parole date. We deem the Board's
decision to not give Northern an earlier
release date an exercise of its discretion.
The Board's right to rely on any factors
known in May 1988, or later adduced at the
July 1988 hearing, and the weight to be
afforded such factors in deciding whether
Northern posed a societal risk, as well as
whether an order of restitution was appropriate, are all matters within the discretion
of the Board. They are precisely the kinds
of issues that are not subject to judicial
review under section 77-27-5(3). Accordingly, we hold that habeas corpus is not
available in this case as a post release
remedy to modify the release date ordered
by the Board.
We have reviewed the remaining issues
raised on appeal and deem them to be

without merit See State v. Carter, 776
P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) (it is within our
discretion to "analyze and address in writing each and every argument, issue, or
claim raised").
CONCLUSION
The trial court's denial of the writ is
affirmed.
GARFF, J., concurs.
BILLINGS, J., concurs in the result

O | HY NUMM« SYSTEM >

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,

William Eluie CASTNER, II and Bonnie
Lee Castner, Defendants and
Appellants.
No. 910275-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Jan. 24, 1992.

Driver and passenger were convicted
in the Eighth District Court, Duchesne
County, Dennis L. Draney, J., of drug-related offenses. Driver and passenger appealed. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held
that (1) request to search for second vehicle identification number on door post
was not reasonably related to issuance of
speeding ticket; (2) driver voluntarily consented to search of vehicle; (3) taint from
illegal search for door post number had
dissipated; and (4) consent to search vehicle extended to contents of containers
found in vehicle and trunk.
Affirmed.
Orme, J., concurred in result only.
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July 7. 1988

To Whom It May

Concern:

I have known Ken Northern for the past £: 1/*E
years while he has
been a inrnate here at the
Duchesne County JailOne of the biggest changes
that I have seen Ken
make is his attitude, his
attitude about
li^e, oeoole, and t^e reasons why
things happen the way they do.
He seems to have
a lot better
unde^st and 1 rip about things anc a lot
more patience.
Ker« has snown us while he has been he~e ail
the many talents that
he possessHe has kestec
himself busy while here with many Different wo v >
projects.
Ken has been a good trustee here at the
jail anz nas heloed
our aeoa^tment
Dy cleaning,
b u i l c m g . aric giving us helpful ideas.
During the
oast few months Ken has he 1 ceo me
along with Sgt. Jerry Foote get our Photo L5D anc
Crime Lab out together. He has taught Sgt. r c o t e
and myself how to aevelope pictures.
I am Sgt.
^oote have appreciated
his help i>" the Lap.
During
the time
while ou^ jaii hac
work
release Ken heloec me arid my widowed rootner on our
farm.
Ken was a great help to me a~c
my mother.
Ken die
all th.is
on his own witnoLt
muc-i
compensation.
Also while on work release Ken also
heloec tne Duchesne County Fair Board builc a new
arena^
stalls, bleachers, and grandstand.
<Bn along witr> a few of the other m r a t e s
he1pec a local boy
with his Eagle Scout Project,
they helped him put a flag pole in tne grouno out
in front of the Sheriff's Office. Ken and the boy
themselves d^iCKec
around
the flag pole, so a
memorial placue could be place on it. This flagpole is a memorial flag pol& for- Lt. G&^rv L. I vie
who was killed in the line of duty.
I feel that
Ken
if paroled will nave tne
support from his family who live in Arizona
anc I
feel that he has the potential to be cooc citizen.
Respectfully,

Lt. Raich Stansfielc
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ADDENDUM E

DUGHESVE COUffTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT
Sheriff Clair M. Poulson
Chief Deputy Doug Horrocks
[Drawer M
Duchesne, UT 84021
1-80O-243-O456
(801)738-2424
(801)722-2210
For Emergency
(801)738-2015
(801)722-4444
For Business
March £ £ ,

1988

Ms. Vicki Palacios, Chairman
Board of Pardons
6065 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Dear Ms. Palacios,
This letter is being written iri regards to
Inmate Kendall Ouinn Northern,
#15o03. Inmate
Northern has been in Duchesne County Jail on the
prison outcount program for the past 2 years. He
•tisl
sas made
*ess
ve^y few
problems while here.
He has been a trusty much of the time and has
preformed a number of different jobs such as
kitchen helper. He has done several remodeling jobs
in the jail, assisted us in our photo lab and other
things.
We have noted that Ken has
good family
support, his folks having traveled from Arizona to
see him on a number of occasions. We have talked
with them on the phone on other occasions. It
appears to us that he would so well being back with
his family in Arizona. We believe that his work
opportunities and living arrangements in Arizona
are very
good. His chances for success if he were
allowed to parole in Arizona would be much better
than if he were required to stay in Utah.,
Thank you for your consideration in this
matter*
Respectfully Yours
Sgt. Veldcm Lefler
Jail C/snunander
ClairV M. Poulson
Sheriff Duchesne County

ADDENDUM F

INTENSIVE SUPERVISION PROGRAM

, "

APPROVAL/DENIAL CHECK LIST

:

CLIENT NAME:

NORTHERN, KENDALL

USP..NO.:

RELEASE DATE:

MAY 10, 1988

XXX

STAFFING DATE:

JANUARY 21, 1988

XXX

3

15009

HIGH RISK
ELEC. MONITORING

APPROVED: The above client has been found to meet all
objective criteria listed on both the memo from the
Board of Pardons and those developed by the ISP Team,
DENIAL: The above client does NOT meet all objective
criteria. The following comments will explain why the
ISP staff made the decision of rejection.

COMMENTS:
According to BCI and the current case file, the
subject is incarcerated for Murder, Agg. Assault,
and Forgery (9 counts). Although Mr. Northern has
no prior adult arrests, he has seven juvenile
referrals or arrests. It should be noted that the
subject shot and killed a cab driver for $26.00 in
cash. The Region III ISP Staff recommends ISP High
Risk as a condition of Mr. Northern's Parole.

Risk

score 31.
The above client has been seen by a member of the ISP Team,
the program has been explained,he/she agreed to participate,
and he/she has signed the attached ISP Agreement.
The above client has not been seen by a member of the ISP
Team, but has had the ISP Program explained on
and agreed to participate.

ADDENDUM G

Board of Pardons
6100 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Re: Kendall Quinn Northern #15009
Dear Members;
I would like to open by thanking you for this oppertunity to have a
say in my future. The future is very important to me. The outcome of
this hearing will have a lasting effect on both my families life and mine.
I was a seventeen year old kid when I entered this institution. I
will be a twenty six year old man when I leave. I am no longer a child.
I have matured and learned from this experiance. I know that prison is
not where I want to be. I know that I have the ability to succeed. My
families support for me is tremendous. And with it I can not fail.
In 1981 I went before the Board of Pardons. My family and I spoke to
them and told them at that time, I wanted to go home to Arizona when released.
My family and I have been planing for my life upon return to Arizona since
that hearing. We have planed for every forseeable problem, every detail of
my return. Until a month ago.
A month ago a problem that was not forseen was thrown into my life. I
received a waiver stating that my parole aggeemenbtwas being changed to
include ISP. That is why I have requested this hearing. To ask why. And
to explain my plans for the future. To explain how much of a detriment to
myself and the state of Utah, Placing me on ISP in Utah would be.
On may tenth I am going to be reieased. I will leave here with the
cloth's on my back and one hundred dollars. If I must stay in Utah and
complete ISP, I must find a place to live where ISP is avialible. I have
a Sister and a Brother in Blanding Utah as well as Aunts and Uncles, Cousins
and a Grandmother there. I also have a job there. But ISP is not avialible
there. Therefore I will have to find a place to live along the Wasatch
Front, in Richfield or in St. George. I do not have any family or relatives
in any of these areas. So I must find a place to live on my own. A place
that will fit my budget of one hundred dollars, to eat, live and clothe
myself on. In my opinion an enviorment such as that would not be condusive
to the successfull completion of ISP. I also have to find a job. Yet if
I spend money on clothing appropriate for job hunting. I will be spending
money I need to live on and pay rent with. On the otherhand, in Arizona,
my family can give me a place to live, food, and the support I need to be
successfull. I also have a good job waiting for me there so I can go
right to work.
During my incarceration I have been informed by prison officials on a
number of occasions that there are contracts on my life. I testified
agianst my partner and because of that my life has been threatend on a number
of occasions. This is why I have been housed in the Duchesne County Jail
for the past two years. For my own protection. Yet the type of enviorment
I will have to stay in if I am required to stay in Utah. Would make it
very easy to find me and carry out these contracts. As you can see my staying
in Utah is not to your advantage or mine.

„. N o r t h e r n v B a r n e s et. al
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As you know from the letters you have received from my family. My best
chance for successfully compleating parole and becoming a productive member
of society is in Arizona with them. I have a good job in construction
waiting for me there. I have a place to live, food to eat and a family
that is as determined for me to succeed as I myself am. Most of all Pheonix
is my home. I grew up there and want to go back. I know I can succeed
there. My family and I have been planing for my return to Pheonix for the
past eight years.
My father has been in touch with the Arizona parole department and they
have told him that they will accept me. But only under Arizona*s parole
system. They said they would not accept any parole stipulations from Utah.
Theywill look at my record, crime, job, housing and prison record. From
these they will plac^me on the level of parole they think is necessary.
Arizona told my father that Utah is aware of this, yet the last parole
agreement given to me to sign seemed to indicate Utah is unwilling to allow
Arizona to set its own conditions for my parole.
Arizona is where I want to go and is where I belong. My best chance for
success is there with my family. I have the abilities and resources to
succeed on parole if you will help me. Please understand that I will live
by, and I will succeed at, any type of parole I am placed on. In Utah or
in Arizona. I am only asking that you help me to succeed. All I want is
a fighting chance.
As I have explained my best chance for success is with my family in
Arizona. Please give me that chance.

Thank You,

Kendall Quinn Northern #15009

ADDENDUM H

BOARD OF PARDONS
onsideration of the Status of

Utah State Prison No. L J ^ L

Kendall Northern

he above-entitled matter came before a Hearing Officer on the
)r consideration as:
. D ORIGINAL HEARING
. D PAROLE VIOLATION

La— day of

|

K' g.»J» II

^^^uvi

and the following witness(es)

2)

, the following decision was rendered:

] Parole to become effective
U**i4k

] Rehearing for
A. JCQ.

Tl**~Pf
#/

A*. • \*i~

, 19 £8

3. • RECISSION HEARING
4. S OTHER —Special A t t e n t i o n

fter hearing the statement of

B.

April

(£)

, 19
KA«.<~4*;~

, 19
wny,t f > ^ r
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T, -..

_, with the following special conditions:
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h*u*A-l
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JA

/„,

, for the following reasons:
C i ^ „
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C^^^r-

£*^

£*±
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B.
] Termination of Sentence to become effective
, 19
1 Expiration of Sentence
, 19
OTE: This Interim Decision is binding and in full force and effect Until reviewed by the Board of Pardons
lembers, who will make the final determination in this matter.
i the event the above named shall be found guilty of any infraction of the Rules and Regulations of the Utah State
rison, of any Community Correction Center or of any residential facility or is found in violation of any law of the
tate of Utah this order may be made null and void.
.-^
April 19i 1988
CVo4
>ate

Hearing Officers

Northern v Barnes et. al.
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ADDENDUM I
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PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUAT

MME: Kendall Quinn Northern
)ATE: 5 May 1988
JSP#: 15009

*

$

&

*

\j~ts
^ ^ifcO
V^cP^
CF

REASON FOR EVALUATION: Request of the Utah State Board of Pardons to aid in determining
suitability of inmate for release on parole.
ASSESSMENT MODALITIES USED: Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, Driggs
Developmental Inventory, BiPolar Psychological Inventory Report, Psychological Interview.
lACKGROUND INFORMATION: Mr. Northern is the youngest of four children born to Donald
nd Claire Northern. He is a well-nourished, healthy-looking white male 26 years of
ge. He reports his childhood was fairly uneventful except that he was always heavy
nd big for his age. His size appears to have caused him difficulty psychologically
ince he felt he never could fit in with others and attributes his initiation into the
rug culture to the fact that "they would accept anybody, just as long as they took
Irugs." Mr. Northern's home life was reported as stable with major moves to Arizona
nd California as a youth. At 16 Mr. Northern left home to wander the western states
nd became more deeply involved with drugs and people using drugs. He stated that he
as high on LSD at the time he commited his crime. Among drugs that Mr. Northern
dmitted to using were LSD, cocaine, amphetamines, and marijuana. He has tried other
rugs such as downers, but stated he found them unsatisfactory. He said he had no
Icohol abuse problem. He is single with no children.
s a prison Inmate Mr. Northern has had disciplinary write ups for his drug usage,
ut that behavior has been absent from his jacket for at least the past four years,
e is presently incarcerated at the Duchesne County Jail where he is reported to be
model inmate according to staff. He was transferred to the Duchesne facility two
ears ago as a protective measure. While at the Utah State Prison and Duchesne, Mr.
orthern maintained an excellent volunteer and work record.
NTERVIEW BEHAVIOR: Mr. Northern was very verbal and cooperative during the assessent interview. It was obvious that he was anxious about the situation, but soon
aimed down after venting his frustrations about the status of his upcoming parole,
e was quite open about his past history and reflective about the consequences of
is past crime. He was very insistant about having drug therapy in addition to any
ental health therapy ordered by the Board, viewing his drug dependancy as a major
actor in his anti-social behavior,
YTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING: No I.Q. tests were administered to Mr. Northern at this
ime. However, he presents himself as an articulate, intelligent, and well-read
idividual. This impression is consistent with earlier testing which placed his
/erall IQ at 129 (superior range). While at the prison Mr. Northern completed his
>sociate of Arts in Business degree and three technical training courses offered
/ the prison.
PAGE 1 of 2
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>ERSONALITY INTEGRATION: Testing showed that Mr. Northern was honest in answering
,est questions and tended to be overly truthful. He definitely feels proud about
is abilities and has high self-esteem, security, self-satisfaction, and a positive
elf-image. He displays an open attitude in listening to and accepting help, and
as a willingness to discuss himself and his problems and cooperate with professional
ealth-care deliverers. He is mildly independent, non-conforming and may have
ifficulty in expressing anger or hostility in a modulated fashion. He is energetic
nd active with rebellious traits in his attitudes and behaviors.
ECOMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS: Overall, Mr. Northern has shown a great deal of
rowth and maturing since his last evaluation in 1984. Part of this maturing may
e due to age, but an important aspect of his growth can be attributed to the social
nteractions and interventions of adults, especially of the staff at the Duchesne
ounty Jail. He has been given more responsibility and respect than at any other
ime of his life which, in turn, has led him to view himself as a responsible adult.
r. Northern shows no evidence of mental illness at this time. His major problem
s his capacity to deal with life's stresses without the use of illegal substances.
* fully realizes this shortcoming and wants to address drug issues as part of his
irole agreement.
, he
I though Mr. Northern can be physically and verbally imposing,
he does
does not appear to
.4.,-.,~
->~A assertive,
lve the capacity for violent acting out. He can be argumentative and
it responds to authority when necessary.
: is this writer's recomendation that Mr. Northern, if he is paroled, be placed in
supportive environment such as family or friends to make transition to society as
leventful as possible. It is strongly recomended that, in addition to any mental
>alth treatment, Mr. Northern receive drug abuse counseling.
IR THE PURPOSES OF THE BOARD OF PARDONS DETERMINATIONS, THIS REPORT IS TO BE REGARDED
> A FAVORABLE ONE.

Ted Brandhurst, Ph.D.
sociate Psychologist

Al Carlisle, Ph.D.
Chief Clinical Psychologist
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ADDENDUM J

UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL

Number:

3.10

Title:

RESCISSION HEARINGS

Authority:

Utah Code Annotated

Purpose:

To establish a process for the taking of a release or rehearing
date once it has been set, and to allow for the designation of a
hearing officer to hear such cases.

Policy:

The release or rehearing date established by ^the/ Board of
Pardons shall remain in effect except upon written referral
indicating that the offender is in violation of the rules and
regulations of the Utah State Prison, Community Corrections
Centers, or laws of any local, state or federal government, or
new evidence is presented that an inmate, if released, would
present a serious risk or danger to the community.

Original Issue Date: 8-15-79
S765C

Date: July 14, 1986

Page: 1 of 2

77-26-7

Revision Date: 07-14-86

Nunber:

3.10

Date: July 14, 1986

Page: 2 of 2

Procedure:
Prior to the rescinding of a parole or rehearing date, information
shall be provided to the Board establishing the basis for the
rescission hearing. Upon receipt of such information, the offender
will
be
scheduled for a rescission hearing.
Except under
extraordinary circunstances, the offender will be notified of all
allegations and the date of the scheduled hearing at least seven days
in advance.
In the event of an escape, the Board will rescind the inmate's date
upon official notification of escape from custody and continue the
hearing until the inmate is available for appearance.
A Board of Pardons hearing officer shall hear all matters when the
violation consists of a new complaint or conviction for a non-violent
felony, misdemeanor, or an adjudicated violation of rules or
regulations. All felonies involving crimes against persons or other
violent felonies shall be heard by the Board.
The hearing officer shall conduct the hearing and make an interim
decision to be reviewed, along with a summary report of the hearing,
by the Board members. Any decision by a hearing officer shall be
binding and in full force and effect until reviewed by Board members,
who will make the final decision by approving, modifying, or
overturning a hearing officer's decision.
The decision is then
entered into the record at a regular scheduled Board meeting and the
offender is then informed by mail of the results. He is not afforded
a personal appearance for this review.

5765C

ADDENDUM K

Mambacs
PAULW.BOYDEN
VICTORIA J. PALACIOS
GARY L WEBSTER

PAUL W.SHEFFIELD.
Administrator

THE STATE OF UTAH
BOARD OF PARDONS
6065 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Consideration of the Status of ^ " Q a l l Q. N o r t h e r n

> utah

609-

State Prison No. J .

The above-entitled matter came on for a hearing before the Utah State Board of Pardons on the
day of
198 ?for consideration as:
°th
July
1.
SPECIAL ATTENTION OF THE BOARD
ORIGINAL HEARING
5. R-^PE
2
REHEARING
RESCISSION
6. f l REJ
REDETERMINATION
a TERMINATION OF SENTENCE AND PAROLE
4.
After the statement of
. and the following witness(es)
FknrPQ.ll
A/Qr-ffonn

1)

I

2)_

and good cause appearing, the Board made the following decision:.

r Q3 Rescind

-r-x)-

_, 19 JTQ parole date,

•

Parole to become effective

•

Amend parole agreement to add the following special conditions:
1.
2.
3.
4.

, 19

•^3 Rehearing for

, with the following special conditions:

, 19 ^D. for the following reasons:

Jft CA f+y*

AfprvflC-

Q Termination of sentence and parole to become effective
•

^19

M ± r ^

faSc',

Crime

Criminal Homicide
Aggravated Jobbery
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

iv

_.19_

Expiration of sentence
REMARKS:

fts*

<-.<:*«r>^

iff-

.!T-/n -

Sentence

^

SasfiUQt

-1-1 if ft CR8Q=264
-i-Li£e CR8CU26/i

Judge

Baldwin
Baidwfcn-

Expir.Date

-fcifer

"tiftr

tt is further ordered that in the event the above named shall be found guilty of any infraction of rules and regulations of the Utah State
Prison, any community corrections center or other residential facility, or shall fail or refuse to perform duties as assigned or is found
in violation of any other law of the State of Utah prior to the effective date of this decision, the order may be made null and void.
J u l
By order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this date
y
signature as Administrator for and on behalf of the State of Utah. Board of Pardons.

GhM)

8

_, 1 &

Paul W.

An application for redetermination may be made after one year from the Board's
previous action. Applications may be obtained through a case worker.

affixed my

ADDENDUM L

Members
PAULW.BOYDEN
VICTORIA J. PALACIOS
GARY L WEBSTER

PAUL W.SHEFFIELD,

THE STATE OF UTAH

Administrator

BOARD OF PARDONS
6065 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Consideration of the Status of

OBSOSNa
_, Utah State Prison No.

KENDALL 0 . NORTHERN

6TH day of

The above-entitled matter came on for a hearing before the Utah State Board of Pardons on the
198 8 for consideration as:

99915009
15009

JULY

SPECIAL ATTENTION OF THE BOARD
ORIGINAL HEARING
5.
RESCISSION
REHEARING
6.
REDETERMINATION
7.
4. •
TERMINATION OF SENTENCE AND PAROLE
. and the following witness(es)
After the statement of
.2).
1).
1.
2.

and good cause appearing, the Board made the following decision: DENY MOTION REQUESTING APPEARANCE AS COUNSEL
AT SPECIAL ATTENTION HEARING: DENY MOTION OF DISCOVERY ON PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORTS.
•

Rescind

•

Parole to become effective

•

Amend parole agreement to add the following special conditions:
1._
2.
3.
4.

•

Rehearing for.

. parole date,

.,19

__, 19

_, 19

, with the following special conditions:

, for the following reasons:

f"l Termination of sentence and parole to become effective.
•

_.19_

Expiration of sentence

.,19.

REMARKS:

Crime
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

CRIMINAL HOMICIDE
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY

Judge
5-LIFE
"5-LIFE

CR80-264
CR80-264

Expir.Date
LIFE
LIFE

BALDWIN
BALDWIN

It is further ordered that in the event the above named shall be found guilty of any infraction of rules and regulations of the Utah State
Prison, any community corrections center or other residential facility, or shall fail or refuse to perform duties as assigned or is found
in violation of any other law of the State of Utah prior to the effective date of this decision, the order may be made null and void.
By order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this date
signature as Administrator for and on behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons.

_, 198 a affixed my

•TTTT.V fi

Paul W. Sheffield, Administrator
An application for redetermination may b
previous action. Applications may be ot^
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ADDENDUM M

r i M V IMVINIW* » « H i l

Third Judicial District

FEB 5 692

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CHARLES STONEMAN SMITH,

*

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO.

Petitioner,

910903060

vs.
UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS,
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter has come to the Court's attention
as a result of a referral from the Fourth Judicial District
Court.

The case was transferred to this Court to consider the

petitioner's
Corpus".

pro

se

Petition

seeking

a

"Writ

of

Habeas

The handwritten Petition was filed April 2, 1991 in

Millard County*
On

June

7,

1991,

the

court

conducted

a

prehearing

conference and set a pretrial conference for June 17, 1991. On
June 17, 1991, at the pretrial conference, the Court denied the
State's Motion to Dismiss and referred the natter to Judge Boyd
Perk of the Fourth District for clarification and preparation
of an Order specifically stating the amount of 'credit for time
served*

to which petitioner was entitled •

A

copy of that

SMITH V. BOARD OF PARDONS
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Order, dated the 30th day of October, 1991, is attached hereto
and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "A"*
In Judge Park'* Order, he granted credit to the defendant
of 626 days of incarceration prior to commitment to the Utah
State Prison*
The Court is informed that the Board of Pardons does grant
credit

for

time

served

in

including a 90 day diagnostic

many

categories

of

commitment,

evaluation, an evaluation while

at the Utah State Hospital, custody while financially unable to
stake bail, retention awaiting parole revocation hearings, and
other potential holdings, with the single exception of credit
for jail tine served as a condition of probation.
In Mr, Smith's case, many of the days served consistent
vith Judge Park's order of October 30, 1991 should qualify for
credit within the Board of Pardons' own guidelines yet the
Board refused to consider the tine (See Exhibits "B", " C and
"D"), and refused to clarify, if it did consider any credit,
hov it was considered and applied to this case.
The Board

in a special attention hearing on the 3rd of

December, 1991, determined to ignore and continues to ignore
the ruling and commitment of Judge Parks (see Exhibit "D").

SXZTH V. BOARD OF PARDONS
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XEMORANDUM DECISION

When the petitioner was committed to the Utah State Prison
on September
commitment*

27, 1989, he bad then served

626 days of his

Since the maximum time one may be held on a 0 to 5

commitment is 1,825 days (365 days times five years), and the
defendant

was

given

credit

for 626 days

time

served,

the

maximum period in which the petitioner may be subject to the
concurrent penalties imposed equals 1,199 days, that is 3.28
years.

(1,825 days minus 626 credit ~ 1,199 days/365 « 3.28

years)
From the date of commitment, September 27, 1989, to the
ultimate release date of January 9, 1993, equals 1,199 days.
That

constitutes

the

total

exposure

of

the

petitioner

to

custody on the concurrent penalties imposed by Judge Park*
The petitioner is now subject to parole release on February
25, 1992.

That is within the period of the maximum exposure of

the petitioner to custodial retention.

It is not clear to the

Court hov on Exhibit "D", the defendant's exposure on one of
the cases is to November 20, 1993.

Notwithstanding that, the

Court determines that the interests of the State of Utah and
the Board of Pardons in the petitioner as a result of these
concurrent commitments from Judge Parks shall terminate January
9, 1993.

SMITH V. BOARD OF PARDONS
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

The Court is aware of the case of State V. Dannv Richard*.
740 P.2d 1314 (6. ct. June, 1987), allowing credit for tine
served when the defendant vas not able to post bail due to
indigency.

Within that case, Justice Stewart Indicated that

both the Model Penal Code and the ABA Standards

"...would

grant credit for presentence detention in all cases."
ease of State v. Mark Francis Schr«udarr

In the

(S. Ct. December,

1985), the court stated that "...our sentencing system vests
almost complete discretion in the Board of pardons to determine
the period of time that will actually be served. •

[at p.

277], and finally, the Court has reviewed the case of state v.
Alvlllar. 748 P.2d 207 (Utah App. 1988),

in which the Court

said that when the defendant was precluded by statute from the
right to bail, (because it was alleged that he had committed a
felony while on probation or parole from another.prior felony),
that no credit would be approved for time served due to the
fact

that

defendant's

detention

was not for indigency in

meeting his bail, but rather was due to a statutory preemption
from bail.
This entire area of law allows the Board of Pardons to
engage

in

discriminatory

practices

that

jeopardizes

the

credibility of the Board and the value of the commitment orders
of the district courts.

Certainly, it is infrequent that one

would serve as many as 626 days confinement in a third degree

SMITH V. BOARD OF PARDONS
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felony case before commitment to prison.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Due to that fact, and

as limited to the circumstances of this case alone, the Court
finds that it would be cruel and unusual punishment to impose a
further penalty on the defendant than the maximum
years, minus the 626 days served.

of five

Certainly, within this outer

limitation, the Board of Pardons has the ability to determine
the time in actual custody at the Utah State Prison and/or
subsequent halfway houses and the period of time on parole,

in

granting this Writ, the Court finds that all the discretionary
internal date decisions available to the Board of Pardons must
be within the outer limits set by the sentencing judge.
appears

consistent

with

the

indeterminate

term

This

sentencing

statutes that have been created by the legislature, and an
issue of concern such as this could only arise in a sentence
with a fixed top, such as a second or third degree felony or
lower offenses.1
1

If the Board of Pardons persists in categorically
denying credit
for time served while on probation without
applying some standard of fairness or discretion to cases
where, as in this case approximately two years time was served,
it would seem that the defense bar and the sentencing judge in
nearly all third degree felonies where the jail time served
would be beyond six months should be inclined to impose a 0 to
5 commitment at the Utah State Prison. That sentence would
require the defendant to serve a few more months on the
average, but would avoid the exposure of twice serving as much
as two years, which seems to be the result in this case*

SMITH V. BOARD OF PARDONS
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Sine* the sentencing judge sets toe outer limits of a
commitment by imposing the statutory 0 to 5 years for • third
degree felony, or 1 to 19 for a second degree felony, or 5 to
life for a first degree felony, the sentencing judge has the
authority, as done in this case, to set that limit consistent
with credit.
Based upon the foregoing, this Court finds that the Writ of
Habeas

Corpus

should

be

and

the

same

consistent with this Memorandum Decision.

is

herein

granted

The maximum exposure

of the petitioner to the criminal justice system in these
concurrent offenses is to January 9, 1993.
This
implement

matter
this

is

returned

ruling

and

to

the

adjust

Board

their

herewith.
Dated this_3~Jz?Iy of February, 1992.

DAVID s
DISTRI

of
dates

Pardons

to

consistent
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MAILING CERTIFleiTg
Z hereby certify that Z Bailed a true end correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision,

to the

following,

this J2A.day of February, 19921

Charles stoneman Smith
Petitioner
• O S . Orange Street
Salt Lake city, Utah 84116
Dexter L. Anderson
Deputy County Attorney
Attorney for Respondent
750 S. Highway 99
Star Route, Box 52
Fillmore, Ctah 84631
Utah Attorney General
6100 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
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